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 STEFAN  H Ö FLER ,  MARKUS  NUSSBAUMER AND  FELIX  UHLMANN 
 Context 
 Switzerland has a multi-lingual, multi-layered civil law system. Its current legal system was 
established in 1848, when the modern Swiss state was founded, and has been further devel-
oped since then. Swiss legislation has come to be shaped by three basic constitutional tenets: 
federalism, direct democracy and separation of powers. 1 Individually and together, these 
tenets have created unique political necessities and legislative traditions. 
 30.1. Layers 
 Swiss legislation is layered hierarchically into federal, cantonal and communal law, each 
of which is in turn layered into a constitution, primary legislation (acts of Parliament) and 
secondary legislation (ordinances). Th is layering refl ects the roles that (a) the diff erent levels 
of government (the confederation, cantons and communes), (b) the people and (c) the three 
branches of government (the legislature, executive and judiciary) play in Swiss legislation. 
 30.1.1. Th e Confederation, Cantons and Communes 
 Switzerland is a federal state. Article 1 of its Constitution 2 stipulates that the Swiss 
Confederation is formed by  ‘ the People and the Cantons ’. 3 In 1848, Switzerland turned from 
a loose confederation into a federal state. Nevertheless, the cantons have retained a strong 
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  4  cf Egli (n 1) 51 – 52; Haller (n 1) 87 – 91; Misic and T ö pperwien (n 1) 157 – 59. 
  5  In addition, international law (issued by organisations such as the United Nations (UN), the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and particularly the 
EU) has recently increased both in terms of reach and volume. It has eff ectively come to form a very substantial 
fi ft h level of government, although one over which Switzerland has only very limited infl uence ( cf  section 30.3.3 ). 
  6  For the qualitative diff erences in cantonal legislation, see  F  Uhlmann ,  ‘ Wer hat und wer macht wie viel ?  – 
Rechtsbestand und Rechtsetzungsaktivit ä t in den Schweizer Kantonen ’ ( 2017 )  2  LeGes  371 . 
position within Switzerland ’ s constitutional framework: they are  ‘ sovereign except to the 
extent that their sovereignty is limited by the Federal Constitution ’ and they  ‘ exercise all 
rights that are not vested in the Confederation ’ (Article 3 of the Federal Constitution). Th e 
Confederation is obliged to  ‘ leave the Cantons suffi  cient tasks of their own and respect their 
organisational autonomy ’ (Article 47, para 2 of the Federal Constitution). Th e cantons, in 
turn,  ‘ shall implement federal law in accordance with the Federal Constitution and federal 
legislation ’ (Article 46, para 1 of the Federal Constitution). Th e Confederation typically 
legislates on issues such as foreign relations, defence, the economy, civil and criminal law 
(and recently also procedural law), nuclear energy, telecommunications and social security, 
while the cantons remain responsible for issues such as education, religion and police, 
health and social benefi ts. Th e Confederation and the cantons are jointly responsible for 
legislation in areas such as public transport, road infrastructure and the environment 
( cf Articles 54 – 135 of the Federal Constitution). Where there is joint responsibility, the 
Confederation may typically enact the general legal framework, but may leave it to the 
cantons to implement it and refi ne the details. 
 To achieve greater harmonisation in Swiss law, the Confederation increasingly 
interferes with areas that have traditionally been the sole responsibility of the cantons ( cf , 
eg, Article 61 a of the Federal Constitution with regard to education). However, the cantons 
may also strive for such harmonisation themselves, namely by entering into agreements 
with each other and establishing common organisations and institutions (Article 48 of the 
Federal Constitution). Th us, they create an intermediate level of government located some-
where between the level of the Confederation and the level of the individual cantons. 4 
 Beneath the cantons, there is yet another level of government: the communes. Th e 
Federal Constitution guarantees the autonomy of the communes  ‘ in accordance with 
cantonal law ’ (Article 50, para 1). Th e Swiss communes are legal entities in their own right 
and are equipped with their own legislature in the form of a communal parliament or town 
hall meetings. Th ey may enact their own laws to the extent that they are authorised to do so 
by cantonal law. 
 Th is fourfold division of competence between the Confederation, the inter-cantonal 
institutions, the cantons and the communes leads to a multi-layered legal system, where, 
in many cases, legal sources from all levels of government will have to be considered when 
a specifi c legal question needs to be resolved. 5 Such a system creates specifi c challenges 
for legislative draft ing: it is crucial that any new laws accurately implement all relevant 
higher-level legislation and that they are themselves amenable to implementation at the 
next lower level of government. At the same time, it also creates opportunities: the cantons 
and the communes eff ectively serve as  ‘ legislative laboratories ’ where diff erent approaches 
to common problems may be implemented and compared. 6 
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  7  cf Haller (n 1) 236 – 41, 244 – 45; Misic and T ö pperwien (n 1) 58 – 59, 75 – 85. For participation in general, see 
 F  Uhlmann and  C  Konrath ,  ‘ Participiation ’ in  U  Karpen and  H  Xanthaki (eds),  Legislation in Europe:  A Comprehen-
sive Guide for Scholars and Practitioners ( Oxford ,  Hart Publishing ,  2017 ) 73 – 95. 
 30.1.2. Th e People 
 Switzerland ’ s Federal Constitution provides three major instruments through which the 
people can participate in legislation: consultation, referendum and popular initiative. Similar 
means of participation exist at the cantonal and communal levels of government. 7 Of these 
three instruments,  consultation is the weakest:  ‘ Th e Cantons, the political parties and inter-
ested groups shall be invited to express their views when preparing important legislation or 
other projects of substantial impact as well as in relation to signifi cant international treaties ’ 
(Article 147 of the Federal Constitution). In other words, the government is obliged to ask 
the public for their opinions, but it is not bound by these opinions. 
 A stronger instrument is provided by the referendum, which, depending on the issue, 
is either mandatory or optional. Under the  mandatory referendum , amendments to the 
Federal Constitution and accessions to organisations for collective security or to suprana-
tional communities must be put to the vote of the people and the cantons, ie, they need to 
be approved both by the people of Switzerland as a whole and by a majority of the people of 
its 26 cantons (Article 140 of the Federal Constitution). Under the  optional referendum , any 
federal act, certain federal decrees and all important international treaties must be submit-
ted to a vote by the people (but not the cantons) if any 50,000 persons eligible to vote or any 
eight cantons request it within 100 days of the offi  cial publication (Article 141 of the Federal 
Constitution). Th e referendum thus equips the people with the power to veto legislation if 
they do not agree with it. 
 Finally, the strongest means of participation is provided by the instrument of the  popular 
initiative : any 100,000 persons eligible to vote may request an amendment of the Federal 
Constitution, which must be put to the vote of the people and the cantons (Article 139 of 
the Federal Constitution). Th us, the people not only comment and decide on legislation, but 
they may also initiate and draft  it ( cf  section 30.2.1 ). However, this last instrument is limited 
to constitutional amendments, which is one of the reasons why the Swiss Constitution occa-
sionally contains provisions that from the perspective of legislative theory would rather 
belong in an act of parliament or even just an ordinance. 
 Th e fact that the Swiss people have the right to be consulted, to veto and even to initiate 
legislation has had a substantial impact on its political institutions as well as its legisla-
tive process and techniques. Among other things, it has forced all major political parties 
to work together, as any one of them would easily be able to block a legislative project by 
means of a referendum or jeopardise a legislative programme through popular initiatives. 
As a result, Switzerland has gradually evolved into a consensus democracy where all major 
political forces are integrated into the government. Naturally, the need to reach consensus 
and participation of the people also slows down the legislative process: in Switzerland, it 
typically takes several years to get from the initiation of a legislative project to the enactment 
of a new law. However, this slowness has the advantage that the result is usually broadly 
accepted. Finally, the fact that a bill will have to pass the test before the people creates a 
strong incentive to make sure that the people will actually be able to understand what it says; 
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  8  For historical reasons, the cantons of Obwalden, Nidwalden, Basel-Stadt, Basel-Landschaft , Appenzell 
Ausserrhoden and Appenzell Innerrhoden each elect one representative and all other cantons two ( cf art 150, 
para of the 2 Federal Constitution). 
  9  cf  ch 12 in this volume. 
  10  Since its foundation in 1848, only four (out of 119) members of the Federal Council have not been re-elected. 
it is thus one of the reasons why Switzerland has developed a strong tradition of draft ing its 
laws in plain language. 
 30.1.3. Legislature, Executive and Judiciary 
 Th e Swiss Parliament, the  Federal Assembly , consists of two chambers: a house of repre-
sentatives, the National Council, and a senate, the Council of States. Th e National Council 
is composed of 200 representatives of the people. Th e representatives are elected directly 
by the people according to a system of proportional representation, with a general election 
being held every four years. Each canton constitutes an electoral constituency. Th e seats 
are allocated to the cantons according to their relative populations. Th e Council of States is 
composed of 46 representatives of the cantons. 8 Th e cantons are free to determine the rules 
for the election of their representatives to the Council of States. Currently, all cantons elect 
their representatives by popular vote. Th us, the members of the Swiss Council of States are 
not emissaries of the cantonal governments like the members of the German Bundesrat; 9 
rather, they represent their cantons in the way that US senators represent their states. In 
contrast to the US Congress, aft er which they were originally modelled, the two chambers 
of the Swiss Federal Assembly have exactly the same rights and duties. In particular, any bill 
must gain the approval of both chambers in order to be enacted. Together with the instru-
ments of direct democracy, this equality of the two chambers of the Swiss Parliament is one 
of the main reasons why, in comparison to other countries, Switzerland ’ s legislative process 
is relatively slow. 
 Th e Swiss executive, the  Federal Council , is a college of seven equal members. Th e 
members of the Federal Council are elected individually by the Federal Assembly following 
each general election to the National Council. Th e President of the Confederation is chosen 
annually from among the members of the Federal Council. However, the position is mostly 
ceremonial; there is no head of government and no individual head of state. By conven-
tion, all major political parties are represented in the Federal Council, without there being 
a  ‘ grand coalition ’ in the proper sense of the word. Th ere is no coalition agreement between 
the parties and thus the government can also not  ‘ fall apart ’. 
 Th e Federal Council is relatively independent of parliament. In contrast to, for example, 
Germany or the UK, the members of the Swiss executive cannot be Members of Parliament 
at the same time; like the US, Switzerland has adopted a strict interpretation of the separa-
tion of powers. By convention, Federal Councillors are re-elected for however long they 
decide to stay in offi  ce. 10 Once elected, they cannot be removed from offi  ce for the dura-
tion of their term: Switzerland ’ s Constitution does not provide for a vote of no confi dence. 
Moreover, the failure of a bill before Parliament or in a referendum does not threaten the 
stability of the government: the Swiss executive does not usually (and indeed does not have 
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  11  cf  Y  Hangartner and  ME  Looser ,  ‘Art. 190 ’ in  B  Ehrenzeller ,  B  Schindler ,  RJ  Schweizer and  KA  Vallender (eds), 
 Die schweizerische Bundesverfassung:  St. Galler Kommentar ,  3rd edn ( Zurich ,  Schulthess ,  2013 ) 3049 – 50 . 
  12  However, the Federal Supreme Court may scrutinise federal legislation under the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), which has led  – at least in part  – to some kind of  ‘ substitute ’ constitutional review. 
  13  cf Federal Council Dispatch of 5 March 2010 on Strengthening Preventive Constitutional Review (BBl 2010 
2187), available at:  www.admin.ch/opc/de/federal-gazette/2010/2187.pdf . 
to) resign over a lost vote. In turn, this also means that Parliament is relatively independent 
of the executive. Th e Federal Assembly interferes heavily in legislative projects presented to 
it by the executive ( cf  section 30.2.3 ). 
 Th e Swiss judiciary, headed by the  Federal Supreme Court , may only provide very limited 
constitutional review. Article 190 of the Federal Constitution stipulates that  ‘ [t]he Federal 
Supreme Court and the other judicial authorities apply the federal acts and international 
law. ’ Th us, the Federal Supreme Court is obliged to apply federal acts even if it deems them 
unconstitutional. Th e rationale behind this provision is to be found in the aforementioned 
instruments of direct democracy. Because there is always the option of a referendum, 
federal acts come with the explicit or tacit consent of the people. Article 190 of the Federal 
Constitution prevents the supposedly paradoxical situation whereby a court, on constitu-
tional grounds, rescinds a federal act that the people, ie, the very source of the Constitution, 
considered to be in keeping with that Constitution. To date, all attempts  – both parliamen-
tary and by means of popular initiative  – to change or abolish this article have failed. 11 As 
a consequence, constitutional review only extends to secondary federal legislation and to 
cantonal law  – and, as strange as it seems, even these must be upheld if their alleged uncon-
stitutionality originates from a federal act or international law. 12 
 Th e limited constitutional review qualifi es the role of the Constitution as the defi n-
ing framework for legislation. Th e Constitution defi nes the key elements of the legislative 
process. It is also due to the Constitution that Parliament is occasionally obliged to pass laws 
against its own will, namely when it must implement constitutional amendments originat-
ing from popular initiatives that it had rejected. Still, the Swiss Parliament is relatively free 
in terms of how to approach a legislative problem. Whereas in Germany, the Constitutional 
Court has struck down acts of Parliament, eg, for lack of suffi  cient gathering of facts, Swiss 
federal acts are beyond such control, and the Swiss Federal Supreme Court is also rather 
lenient on the cantons in this regard. Eff ectively, it is Parliament that has the last say on 
the constitutionality of its own acts. However, such power is not only a privilege but also a 
burden. It may help explain certain elements of the legislative process, such as the prelimi-
nary constitutional review of all bills during the draft ing process. One may even contend 
that Article 190 of the Federal Constitution has fostered a tradition of diligent law-making, 
where the preparatory work carried out by the administration is intended to compensate for 
the lack of an  ex post facto constitutional review by the courts. 13 
 30.2. Process 
 Depending on the tier of legislation involved (Constitution, act of parliament or  ordinance), 
the Swiss legislative process consists of up to fi ve phases: (a) initiation; (b) draft ing; 
(c) parliamentary deliberation; (d) referendum, commencement and publication; and 
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  14  cf M Th ommen,  ‘ Swiss Legal System ’ in Th ommen (n 1) 27 – 30. 
  15  Federal Act on Political Rights of 17 December 1976 (SR 161.1). 
(e) evaluation. 14 In what follows, we describe the legislative process of the Confederation; 
similar processes apply at the cantonal and communal levels of government. 
 30.2.1. Initiation 
 Constitutional amendments may be introduced by way of legislation or by means of a popu-
lar initiative. In the former case, the process is the same as for federal acts (see below), 
except for the fact that constitutional amendments are subject to a mandatory rather than 
an optional referendum. In the latter case, any 100,000 persons eligible to vote may request 
that the Constitution be amended; the respective signatures must be collected within 18 
months of the offi  cial publication of the initiative. In theory, popular initiatives may either 
take the form of a specifi c bill or of a general proposal to be turned into a specifi c bill 
by Parliament (Article 139 of the Federal Constitution). In practice, almost all popular 
initiatives are submitted in the form of a specifi c bill. Initiators are usually suspicious of 
Parliament and prefer to retain control over the content of their proposal. 
 Popular initiatives must comply with the requirements of consistency of form, and of 
subject matter, and must not infringe upon any mandatory provisions of international law. 
Th e Federal Assembly must declare an initiative to be invalid in whole or in part if it fails to 
meet these requirements (Article 139, para 3 of the Federal Constitution). Apart from such 
invalidation, neither Parliament nor any other authority may change the text of a popular 
initiative once it has been submitted, not even the initiators themselves. Th us, the text of the 
constitutional amendment is fi nal even before the fi rst signature has been collected and the 
political discussion has begun. 
 Th e Federal Assembly may decide to draft  a counter-proposal to be put to the vote 
together with a popular initiative. In the referendum, the people may vote in favour of 
both proposals; in response to the third question, they may indicate the proposal that they 
prefer if both are accepted (Article 139 b of the Federal Constitution). Like all constitutional 
amendments initiated by Parliament, counter-proposals are prepared by way of legislation. 
Alternatively, the Federal Assembly may prepare an indirect counter-proposal in the form 
of a federal act rather than a constitutional amendment. In this case, the initiators may with-
draw their popular initiative under the express condition that the indirect counter-proposal 
is not rejected in a referendum (Article 73 a , para 2 of the Political Rights Act). 15 
 Th e preparation of  federal acts may be initiated by the Federal Council, by Parliament 
or by a canton. It may be triggered, among other things, by the need to implement a newly 
adopted constitutional amendment. Th e Federal Council has a general right to draft  bills 
and submit them to Parliament (Article 181 of the Federal Constitution). Most legislative 
projects are initiated in this way. However, bills may also be prepared and introduced by a 
parliamentary committee (a so-called parliamentary initiative). Th is option has recently 
gained traction, with Parliament increasingly trying to curtail the infl uence of the Federal 
Council. In addition, any Member of Parliament, any parliamentary group and any canton 
may propose that parliament pass legislation on a certain matter. If the Federal Assembly 
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  16  cf  G  M ü ller and  F  Uhlmann ,  Elemente einer Rechtssetzungslehre ,  3rd edn ( Zurich ,  Schulthess ,  2013 ) 270 – 74. 
  17  S H ö fl er, M Nussbaumer and H Xanthaki,  ‘ Legislative Draft ing ’ in Karpen and Xanthaki (n 7) 153. 
agrees, it tasks the Federal Council (in the case of parliamentary motions) or a parliamen-
tary committee (in the cases of parliamentary and cantonal initiatives) with draft ing a bill. 
 Th e executive issues  ordinances where a federal act requires further implementation and 
where the legislature has delegated the right to legislate on a minor issue to the executive ( cf 
Articles 164 and 182 of the Federal Constitution). Ordinances may be issued by the Federal 
Council, a Federal Department (ministry), a Federal Offi  ce or another government agency 
provided they have the authority to do so under the Constitution or the law. Th e draft ing 
of ordinances follows the same procedure as the draft ing of federal acts, but in contrast to 
federal acts, ordinances are not submitted to Parliament and they are not subject to a refer-
endum. However, there is an ongoing debate as to whether Parliament should be given more 
infl uence over the content of ordinances, eg, whether it should be equipped with a right to 
veto them. 16 Even under current law, the Federal Council is already obliged to provide an 
explanation if it submits a bill to Parliament that delegates legislative powers to the execu-
tive, and Parliament may request draft  ordinances in order to assess the consequences of 
such delegations. 
 30.2.2. Draft ing 
 Swiss federal legislation is usually draft ed by the administration. Even if a bill is formally 
prepared by a parliamentary committee, the administration is usually tasked with the actual 
draft ing of the text. Th e draft ing phase of the legislative process falls into three stages: (a) the 
preparation of a preliminary draft ; (b) the consultation of the public; and (c) the preparation 
of a fi nal draft . 
 30.2.2.1. Preliminary Draft  
 New legislation is conceptualised and composed in the government offi  ce responsible for 
the policy area concerned. Switzerland has adopted a de-centralised model of legislative 
draft ing, ie, the draft s are prepared not by specialised legislative draft ers, but by domain 
experts familiar with the subject matter at hand. Th ere are pros and cons to such a model: 
 Th e advantage of a model where draft ing is a general, decentralised function is that it facilitates the 
exchange of information between those in charge of draft ing the law and those applying it. Domain 
knowledge and practical experience can easily be accessed at all stages of the draft ing process. As 
domain specialists are in charge of draft ing, special emphasis is given to the applicability of the 
new legislation and its compatibility with current practice. Th e main disadvantage is that domain 
specialists are usually less familiar with the techniques of formal legistics and the principles of 
plain-language writing than professional draft ers. Th ey are also more prone to getting tangled up 
in matters of policy; as a result, general legal constraints may be neglected and the authors may 
fail to adopt the perspective of the target audience and thus infringe on the clarity of the law. 17 
 To remedy some of the disadvantages of the model, the offi  ce in charge of a draft  is obliged 
to invite all other offi  ces of government that may have an interest in the legislative project to 
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Bundesverwaltung und ihre Arbeit an der Gesetzessprache ’ in  KM  Eichhoff -Cyrus and  G  Antos (eds),  Verst ä ndlichkeit 
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schweizerischen Bundesverwaltung ’ in  F  Uhlmann and  S  H ö fl er (eds.),  Gute Gesetzessprache als Herausforderung 
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und Bundesamt f ü r Justiz ’ ( 2008 )  7  AJP  901 ;  Schweizerische  Bundeskanzlei ,  Gesetzestechnische Richtlinien 
( Bern ,  2013 ) , available online (in German, French and Italian) at:  www.bk.admin.ch  > Dokumentation  > 
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  22  Consultation Procedure Act of 18 March 2005 (SR 172.061). 
  23  All planned, running and completed consultations can be inspected online (in German, French and Italian) at: 
 www.admin.ch  > Bundesrecht  > Vernehmlassungen. 
comment on it (the so-called  ‘ consultation of offi  ces ’ ). 18 In the course of this internal review, 
the draft  is also examined by three centralised institutions: (a) the Federal Offi  ce of Justice 
checks if the draft  complies with the Constitution and international law; 19 (b) the Internal 
Draft ing Committee, an inter-disciplinary body made up of language specialists and legal 
experts, ensures that the language used in the draft  is clear and comprehensible; 20 and 
(c) the Federal Chancellery checks if the draft  adheres to the rules of formal legistics. 21 
Th ese three institutions bring specialised knowledge to the draft ing process: knowledge 
about constitutional constraints, about plain-language draft ing and about the formal 
requirements that federal laws must fulfi l. 
 30.2.2.2. Public Consultation 
 All preliminary draft s of constitutional amendments, federal acts and important ordinances 
(as well as important international treaties) must then be released for public consulta-
tion (Article 147 of the Federal Constitution). Th is procedure has  ‘ the aim of allowing the 
Cantons, political parties and interested groups to participate in the shaping of opinion 
and the decision-making process of the Confederation. It is intended to provide informa-
tion on material accuracy, feasibility of implementation and public acceptance of a federal 
project ’ (Article 2 Consultation Procedure Act). 22 In theory, everyone can participate in 
this process. In practice, the instrument is mainly used by political parties, special interest 
groups and, crucially, the cantons. Remarks may be submitted for a period of three months. 
Th e administration analyses the responses and summarises them in a report. 23 
 Th e feedback provided by the participants of a public consultation has no binding eff ect. 
Th e purpose of a public consultation is merely to test the political feasibility of a legislative 
project. It enhances the transparency of the legislative process at an early but important 
stage. Th e information gathered adds to the fact-fi nding and practicability assessment of 
the project. If both the cantons as well as private organisations state that the draft  bill would 
be diffi  cult to implement or would cause unnecessary administrative burdens, such remarks 
are usually taken seriously. Still, public consultation does not produce scientifi c evidence: 
it is neither an expert opinion nor a poll. Participation in a public consultation may be 
distributed rather asymmetrically: the opinion of certain lobbying groups in particular may 
be over-represented in the responses returned to the administration. Th is needs to be taken 
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 4th edn ( Bern ,  2019 ) , available online (in German, French and Italian) at:  www.bk.admin.ch  > Dokumentation  > 
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  25  Th e Federal Gazette is available online (in German, French and Italian) at:  www.admin.ch  > Bundesrecht  > 
Bundesblatt. 
  26  As the text enacted by Parliament may deviate from the text described in the dispatches (see  section 30.2.3 ), 
the courts may also consult the offi  cial bulletin protocolling the parliamentary deliberations, available online at: 
 www.parlament.ch  > Parliamentary business  > Offi  cial bulletin. 
into consideration when the results are analysed. In general, the more seriously respondents 
are taken, the more capable they are to defeat a project in a referendum. 
 30.2.2.3. Final Draft  
 Th e analysis of the comments from the public consultation lead to revision of the draft  (or 
its abandonment). During this process of consolidation, a second round of internal review 
(consultation of offi  ces) is carried out and the draft  is examined once again with regard to 
its constitutionality, clarity and adherence to the rules of formal legistics. Aft er this second 
round of internal review, the draft  is fi nalised and submitted for approval to the Federal 
Council, the parliamentary committee or, in the case of subordinate ordinances, the Federal 
Department, Federal Offi  ce or other government agency in charge. 
 For ordinances, this is the end of the legislative process  – they are enacted and published, 
whereas draft s of constitutional amendments and federal acts are now forwarded to 
Parliament. With this aim in mind, they are attached to an offi  cial dispatch or report in which 
the Federal Council or the parliamentary committee, respectively, explains its motivations 
for the respective piece of legislation, summarises the results of the public consultation, 
details the content of the individual provisions contained in the draft , shows that the bill 
complies with the Constitution and international law, and points to the likely impact the 
new piece of legislation will have on the cantons, the communes, the economy, the envi-
ronment and society at large (Article 141 of the Parliament Act). 24 Th e Federal Council 
dispatches and committee reports are important auxiliary texts that the courts may resort to 
if the interpretation of a provision in the respective federal act is unclear. Th ey are published 
in the Federal Gazette 25 and they are explicitly mentioned in the preamble of federal acts. 
Th e preamble of the aforementioned Consultation Procedure Act, for example, reads as 
follows:  ‘ Th e Federal Assembly of the Swiss Confederation, based on Article 147 of the 
Federal Constitution, and having considered the Federal Council Dispatch of 21 January 
2004, decrees:  … ’ 26 
 30.2.3. Parliamentary Deliberation 
 Decisions of the Federal Assembly require the agreement of both chambers (Article 156, 
para 2 of the Federal Constitution). Bills are fi rst considered by one chamber and then, if 
approved, are passed on to the other. Except in the case of urgency, the second chamber 
will only consider the bill in a subsequent session of parliament. Considerations in either 
chamber are organised as a two-step process: bills are fi rst considered by the parliamentary 
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committee in charge, which makes a recommendation, and only then by the chamber as a 
whole. Th e committee as well as any Member of Parliament may propose amendments to 
a bill, and either chamber may amend the bill, refer it back to the Federal Council or to the 
committee entrusted with its examination for review or amendment, refuse to introduce the 
bill in the fi rst place or, aft er consideration, reject it altogether. Due to the Swiss Parliament ’ s 
relative independence from the executive ( cf  section 30.1.3 ), this is not a rare occurrence. 
 If, following consideration of a bill, there are diff erences between the chambers, the 
divergent decisions of each chamber are referred to the other chamber for consideration 
until agreement is reached between the two chambers. If there are still diff erences following 
three detailed discussions in each chamber, a conciliation committee composed of select 
members of both chambers is appointed; this committee is tasked with proposing a compro-
mise motion that eliminates the remaining diff erences in their entirety. If the compromise 
motion is rejected by either of the chambers, the bill is abandoned. 
 30.2.4. Referendum, Commencement and Publication 
 Constitutional amendments are subject to a mandatory referendum and federal acts are 
subject to an optional referendum ( cf  section 30.1.2 ). Constitutional amendments  generally 
come into force on the day of their adoption by the people and the cantons (Article 15, 
para 3 of the Political Rights Act), whereas the commencement of federal acts is usually 
delegated to the Federal Council. 
 Ordinarily, enactments must be published at least fi ve days before they come into force 
(Article 7, para 1 of the Publications Act). 27 Swiss federal law is published in two ways: in 
a chronological compilation, 28 where the texts are published in the form in which they are 
enacted, and in a systematic compilation, 29 where they are presented in consolidated form. 
If in doubt, the version of a text published in the chronological compilation is authorita-
tive; until 2015, this referred to the paper version of the texts, but since January 2016, the 
electronic version published on the website of the Confederation has become authoritative 
(Article 15 of the Publications Act). 30 
 30.2.5. Evaluation 
 Article 170 of the Swiss Federal Constitution stipulates that:  ‘ Th e Federal Assembly shall 
ensure that federal measures are evaluated with regard to their eff ectiveness. ’ While this 
provision is oft en mentioned in discussions of how Swiss legislation is evaluated  ex post , its 
practical impact is moderate at best. It may act as a reminder for Parliament to take seriously 
its duty to aim for  ‘ good ’ legislation, but it cannot be enforced by the Supreme Court due to 
Article 190 of the Federal Constitution ( cf  section 30.1.3 ). 
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Kritik ( Zurich ,  Dike ,  2018 ) 4 – 10. 
  32  Publications Act of 18 June 2004 (SR 170.512). 
  33  cf H ö fl er et al (n 17) 160. 
  34  cf  S  Steiner ,  ‘ Redaktionskommission ’ in  M  Graf ,  C  Th eler and  M  von Wyss (eds),  Parlamentsrecht und 
Parlamentspraxis der Schweizerischen Bundesversammlung ( Basel ,  Helbing Lichtenhahn ,  2014 ) 465 – 89. 
 Th is circumstance may also explain why, so far, more recent trends in  ex ante evalua-
tion have not been applied on a regular basis in Switzerland. While the dispatch or report 
accompanying a bill must include a cursory assessment of its potential eff ects and costs 
(Article 141 of the Parliament Act;  cf  section 30.2.2.3 ), an in-depth ex-ante evaluation is 
not required. However, calls for such an evaluation (eg, regulatory impact assessment) or a 
limitation on legislative activity (eg sunset legislation or one-in, one-out legislation) to be 
installed in the legislative process have become more frequent in recent years. 31 
 30.3. Techniques 
 Switzerland ’ s constitutional set-up has also infl uenced its draft ing techniques. Two elements 
in particular stand out: (a) the multi-lingualism of its legal system; and (b) Switzerland ’ s 
tradition of plain-language draft ing. Th e latter has recently come under threat from (c) 
international and particularly EU law. 
 30.3.1. Multi-lingualism 
 Switzerland has four national languages (German, French, Italian and Romansh), the fi rst 
three of which serve as offi  cial languages of the Confederation (Articles 4 and 70, para 1 of 
the Federal Constitution). All federal legislation is published in German, French and Italian, 
and  ‘ the three versions are equally binding ’ (Article 14, para 1 of the Publications Act). 32 
 Federal acts (and constitutional amendments brought about by way of legislation) may 
originally be draft ed either in German or in French, but for the fi rst round of internal review 
at the latest, draft s are made available in both languages (co-revision). 33 For the sake of 
reviewing draft s of federal acts, the Internal Draft ing Committee forms working groups for 
four, consisting of a linguist and a lawyer of either language. Th e two versions of the text 
are revised and further developed in parallel. At the end of this process, neither language 
version can be considered the  ‘ original ’ or the  ‘ translation ’ anymore. Due to the relatively 
small number of Italian-speaking civil servants, the Italian version of a federal act, even 
though equally binding, is a mere translation of the German and the French texts. Prior to 
the fi nal vote in Parliament, a special parliamentary committee, the Draft ing Committee of 
the Federal Assembly, 34 ensures, among other things,  ‘ that the versions in the three offi  cial 
languages are consistent ’ (Article 57, para 2 of the Parliament Act), ie, that all three language 
versions have the same form and the same content. In contrast to federal acts,  ordinances  – 
except for the most important ordinances  – are usually draft ed in just one language and are 
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only translated into the other languages towards the end of the draft ing process; the Federal 
Chancellery ensures that the three language versions are consistent (co-editing). 35 
 Popular initiatives, in most cases, are originally submitted in just one language. Th e 
text is then translated and co-revised by the administration; this happens in close coordi-
nation with the initiators. At the end of this process, the administration certifi es that the 
three language versions of the text are equivalent. Aft er this point, the text can no longer be 
changed and the collection of the required signatures may begin. 36 
 Th e multi-lingualism of the Swiss legal system represents both a challenge and an oppor-
tunity. On the one hand, additional safeguards have to be put in place to ensure that all 
language versions of a legislative text end up having the same content. Th is requires extra 
time and the involvement of additional language experts. On the other hand, comparing 
diff erent language versions of a legislative text has proven useful both for legislative draft ing, 
where uncertainties and loopholes may be found that would otherwise have been over-
looked, and for the later interpretation of the text by the courts, where ambiguities present 
in one language version may be resolved when consulting the others. 37 However, this advan-
tage builds on the fact that the number of language versions to be considered is small and 
that even though there are multiple languages, there is only one legal system. 
 30.3.2. Plain Language 
 Switzerland has a long-standing tradition of plain-language legislative draft ing that dates 
back at least to the beginnings of the modern Swiss state in the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries, 38 and continues to play an important part in Switzerland ’ s public, political 
and legal discourse. 39 Th ere are several explanations for this tradition. 40 A fi rst explanation 
may be found in the instruments of participation and direct democracy provided by the 
Swiss Constitution. Th e fact that the public will be invited to comment on the draft  of a new 
piece of legislation and the possibility that the people will have to vote on it create strong 
incentives for the use of plain language: the more sceptical people are of the comprehensi-
bility of an act, the less likely they are to accept it. A second explanation is closely related: 
Switzerland ’ s so-called  ‘ militia ’ tradition. Customarily, a majority of the public offi  ces in 
Switzerland have been held not by career politicians or lawyers, but by laymen. Among 
other things, this has also had an eff ect on the language of Swiss laws: in comparison to 
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Germany ’ s legislative language, which is generally considered to be complex, diffi  cult to 
understand and almost pedantically detail-oriented, Switzerland ’ s legislative language 
seems plain, down to earth and easily accessible. 41 A third explanation for Switzerland ’ s 
tradition of plain-language draft ing can be found in the aforementioned multi-lingualism 
of its legal system: Swiss laws have to be rendered in multiple languages and this is easier to 
accomplish if they are written in plain language. 
 At the federal level of government, the use of plain language has even been enshrined 
in the law: Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Languages Act 42 stipulates that the federal authori-
ties must  ‘ endeavour to ensure that their language is appropriate, clear and comprehensible 
and shall ensure that gender-appropriate wording is used ’. Moreover, the care for plain-
language legislative draft ing has been entrusted to a special institution, the Internal Draft ing 
Committee of the Federal Administration, an institution whose main purpose is to ensure 
that all federal enactments are draft ed in comprehensible language. Th e Committee is 
composed of language specialists as well as legal experts; it checks all draft s of federal 
acts and ordinances in the course of the internal review process and provides the authors 
with suggestions as to how their draft  could be improved from a linguistic point of view. 
Even though the Committee has no authority over the text, it has become well established 
in Switzerland ’ s legislative process since its creation in 1976 43 and its advice is generally 
respected and followed. Th is is particularly due to the fact that the Committee does not just 
criticise draft s, but actually suggests alternative wordings where a text is diffi  cult to under-
stand. Th e authors in turn are obliged to discuss the Committee ’ s suggestions and it is oft en 
in the course of this personal exchange that an adequate fi nal wording is found. 44 
 Draft s of federal acts are additionally examined by a special parliamentary committee, 
the Draft ing Committee of the Federal Assembly, prior to the fi nal vote in Parliament. 45 Th is 
committee is also tasked, among other things, with ensuring  ‘ that the texts are formulated in 
a concise and understandable manner ’ (Article 57, para 2 of the Parliament Act). However, 
due to the late point at which it comes into play, its infl uence on the texts is much more 
limited than that of the adminstration ’ s Internal Draft ing Committee. 
 30.3.3. International Law 
 With regard to the relationship between national and international law, Switzerland has 
adopted a monist system. 46 International law does not have to be translated into national 
law; rather, it is incorporated into Swiss law as is once it has been ratifi ed and thus becomes 
directly applicable. 47 However, international treaties frequently have to be implemented by 
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means of national legislation. For this purpose, legal concepts and legal terminology alien 
to Swiss law have to be transposed into national legislation. 
 Th e challenge is particularly accentuated with regard to European Union (EU) law. 
While Switzerland is not a member of the EU, its law has nevertheless become closely inter-
twined with EU law. Th is development leads to a clash of two legislative cultures that in 
many regards could not be more diff erent: on one side, Switzerland ’ s tradition of plain-
language, no-nonsense draft ing, and on the other, the EU ’ s habit of composing verbose, 
detail-oriented legislative texts. In general, there are three possible strategies to implement 
EU law in Swiss legislation: the EU provision can be either copied, rephrased or merely 
referenced in the Swiss text. Copying has the advantage that it creates the appearance that 
the EU and the Swiss provision are identical. It also does not require the authors of the Swiss 
text to fully understand the EU provision. However, this strategy oft en raises the problem 
that the original provision is taken out of context and thus in fact does not retain its original 
meaning when inserted in the Swiss text. Rephrasing, in turn, oft en has the advantage that it 
facilitates the understandability of the text and that the provision better fi ts into the context 
of the Swiss law. However, it comes with the disadvantages that it is labour-intensive and 
that one can never be sure whether the rephrased provision has exactly the same meaning 
as the EU provision. Finally, referencing is cheap and makes it transparent that the respec-
tive provision originates from and is meant to be identical to EU legislation. Th e problem 
is that it oft en obfuscates the actual content of a provision: the content only becomes clear 
once one has studied the respective EU text and followed any further references contained 
therein. 48 In sum, none of the mentioned solutions is ideal. Th us, the infl uence of EU legis-
lation will likely continue to pose a threat to Switzerland ’ s tradition of plain-language and 
high-transparency draft ing. 
 30.4. Education 
 Legal education in Switzerland, like elsewhere, is still almost exclusively concerned with the 
interpretation and application of law; traditionally, the education of lawyers has included 
very little training in the theory and practice of legislation. 49 Recently, however, some Swiss 
universities have begun to off er such courses at the master ’ s level: master ’ s courses in legisla-
tion can now be attended at the Universities of Basel, Bern, Fribourg, Geneva and Zurich. 50 
Th ese recent developments notwithstanding, draft ing skills are still mostly acquired on the 
job, eg, with the help of guidelines for legislative draft ing. 51 
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 Several institutions off er vocational training for practitioners. Th e Institute of Federalism 
of the University of Fribourg, together with the Swiss Society of Legislation, the Swiss Federal 
Chancellery and the Federal Offi  ce of Justice, organise two seminars on legal methodol-
ogy and legal draft ing every year (the so-called  ‘ Murten Seminars ’ ). Th e Centre d ’ é tude, de 
technique et d ’ é valuation l é gislatives (CETEL) of the University of Geneva regularly off ers 
similar courses in French. Th e Swiss Society of Legislation and the Centre for Legislative 
Studies at the University of Zurich each organise annual conferences and seminars. 
 Since 1990, the Swiss Society of Legislation, together with the Swiss Evaluation Society, 
has edited a scientifi c journal dedicated to legislation:  LeGes  – Legislation  & Evaluation . 52 
 LeGes appears three times a year. It includes theoretical and applied papers in German, 
French, Italian, Romansh and English that deal with questions relating to the goal of 
achieving good, comprehensible and eff ective legislation.  LeGes serves as a channel of 
communication for the practitioners and scholars of legislation in Switzerland. 
 30.5. Outlook 
 In comparison to other countries, the legislative process in Switzerland is relatively slow. 
Th is has to do with its federalism, direct democracy and separation of powers. It might be 
asked whether the  ‘ engine ’ powering Swiss legislation is too weak and its  ‘ breaks ’ too strong 
to meet the expectations of a swift  implementation of internationally accepted standards. 
However, the slowness of the Swiss legislative process, combined with its tendency to search 
for compromise before any decisions have been taken, has proven to yield good results. 
Despite frequent complaints that the quality of legislation has markedly decreased and that 
better regulation is urgently needed, 53 Switzerland on average still produces  ‘ good ’ laws: 
both its legislative process and the actual texts that the process yields exhibit relatively high 
levels of transparency and are generally well accepted. However, this achievement has come 
under pressure from an increasingly activist political environment, the growing infl uence 
of ever more complex international and EU law, and the fast pace at which legislation is 
expected to happen in an age where digitalisation has become an end in itself. 54 Only time 
will tell whether Switzerland can maintain the quality of its legislation in such political, legal 
and societal circumstances. 
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